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ABSTRACT 
A COMPATIBILIST THEORY OF JUSTICE AND DESERT 
BY 
Matthew John Cutler 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2009 
This thesis argues against the asymmetry of desert observed across theories of 
distribution and retribution. While distributive theories have downplayed the significance 
of desert, retributive theories have outwardly embraced the role of desert in punishment. 
At the heart of this imbalance rests an unresolved tension between determinism and 
freedom. In the interest of bringing symmetry to theories of justice, this thesis reconciles 
determinism and freedom as two compatible notions of human actions and traits. 
Additionally, this thesis argues for an increase in opportunities afforded to the 
least advantaged in order to balance punishments and benefits. This position stems from 
an acknowledgment of the empirical realities of crime and punishment in capitalist 
societies. Foremost among the empirical concerns of this thesis is the reality that 
criminality in capitalist societies is highly concentrated among those residing on the 
lowest rungs of the socioeconomic hierarchy. The compatibility of determinism and 
freedom and the rejection of the asymmetry of desert are utilized in making a case for the 
desert of opportunity as a priority of just societies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Theorists argue over what individuals deserve in virtue of a variety of factors, but 
they generally agree that the structure of desert takes the form; A deserves B in virtue of 
C (Moriarty 519). In addition, theorists generally agree that desert is a natural property as 
opposed to an institutional one (Moriarty 519). By a natural versus institutional property, 
it is meant that the concept of desert is a universal norm that functions the same in every 
culture rather than a relative social norm that may function differently from culture to 
culture due to varying interpretations of what is just. According to the naturalist 
perspective, people are understood to be deserving of things across political and cultural 
boundaries, thus desert is universally applied. If someone gets something they deserve, 
people generally agree that this is a just outcome; if that person does not receive what 
they deserve, this is generally held as unjust. The challenge to this notion of naturalism is 
the institutional argument which places more emphasis on the social structure of deserts 
and their bases. For example, John Rawls argues that even though someone may get what 
they deserve, this is only regarded as just by those who are socially situated on the side 
that would adhere to that conclusion. The assumption that someone deserves something, 
as well as the conclusion that their receiving it is just, is a socially constructed property 
that can vary across cultures. I adopt neither the naturalist nor institutional perspective, as 
I find it necessary to embrace the conclusions drawn by both perspectives in arguing for a 
symmetrical system of justice. The central argument contained herein is that socially and 
economically disadvantaged people deserve a fair system of opportunities in the 
distributive sense on the basis of need and the traditional moral retributive arguments in 
favor of punishment must be qualified by such a moral distributive argument for desert if 
they are to be justifiable. My intention is not to reaffirm retribution in this paper, but I do 
encourage future theorists to decide whether or not retribution will be necessary to 
maintain as an institution of justice in light of the movement towards restorative justice. 
Included in my thesis will be an inspection of the asymmetry of desert across 
distributive and retributive theories of justice. Contemporary discussion of desert has just 
begun to address this issue and this asymmetry has yet to be justified or defeated. 
Therefore, my research will attempt to pick up where the most recent and relevant work 
has left off. In his article, Against the Asymmetry of Desert, Jeffrey Moriarty suggested 
that further researchers who doubt that the asymmetry can be justified pursue the task of 
deciding who is wrong: distributive theorists who reject desert, or retributive theorists 
who embrace it (Moriarty 533). Distributive theorists generally reject personal desert 
because of its alleged impracticability in determining the distribution of benefits. This 
means that it is impossible to determine what part of a person's desert base (a basis for 
claiming to be deserving of an outcome) is attributable to her own, uninhibited free will 
and what part is traceable to some outside influence or support. Retributive theory, on the 
other hand, has been quick to determine that people deserve punishment for their 
wrongful acts and has given little consideration to the part of the individual's action that 
can be attributable to her social and economic circumstance. 
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Additional notions of justice relevant to this discussion do exist, namely 
restorative and utilitarian justice. Restorative justice seeks to rehabilitate criminal 
offenders and return them to society. A restorative perspective would agree that an 
offender deserves some degree of punishment, but it would posit that this punishment 
should in part be constructively geared toward returning that offender back to the society 
as a law-abiding individual. In this sense, a restorative perspective would argue that the 
criminal deserves the chance to live lawfully amongst the rest of those people who have 
refrained from engaging in criminal behavior. The utilitarian perspective, however, 
would only accept an outcome if it meant that its occurrence would produce the greatest 
good. The maximization of social welfare or utility does not require an evaluation of 
personal deserts. Utilitarian concerns can be considered neutral or indifferent to the 
concept of desert, but the notion of social utility is apparent in my thesis. Just as 
punishment can be said to fulfill utilitarian concerns of public safety or deterrence, the 
distribution of opportunities should fulfill the utilitarian concern of social welfare. Utility 
is unconcerned with moral desert, however, which leads me away from adopting a 
utilitarian argument for distribution. I will challenge the traditional retributive and 
distributive frameworks, but it is my intention to expand desert of benefits within a 
retributivist framework. Opportunity is among the benefits that can be deserved, yet it has 
been ignored. Restorative justice may find my arguments concerning the desert of 
opportunity useful. Establishing the desert of opportunity will bring a balance to 
retributive claims and it is a step that I see as necessary to providing for a just and 
symmetrical social order. Therefore, the desert of opportunity will be at the center of my 
argument. 
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Theorists have approached desert in an a priori fashion. Much of what is written is 
based upon moralistic and normative assumptions about the human experience and 
theories typically build upon the foundations of previous theories without much 
consideration of the present social reality. In my thesis I hope to break from the 
foundation that has been built up from common theories of desert. Since it seems 
counterproductive to completely detach the individual from his or her social 
circumstance, the more sensible route to symmetry of desert between theories of justice 
would be through the social structure itself. This is not meant to be a general theory 
applicable to every institution and/or culture, but the value it contains is to be considered 
universally applicable to at least all capitalist democracies. 
Much of the literature on desert presumes an individuality of human behavior 
which may not fully explain the entire spectrum of behaviors and actions that individuals 
partake in. The human experience is undeniably a social one filled with day-to-day 
interactions and conflict between individuals. Disciplines concerned with the human 
experience should not actively separate individuals from the social structures that they 
compose. This is the fundamental flaw I have found with much of the philosophical 
literature on the role of desert injustice. The existing literature justifies desert in virtue of 
some individual characteristic or action. Individuals deserve benefits or punishments in 
virtue of hard work, merit, virtue, or wrongful acts, but individuals are not fully 
responsible for any of them. Without reference to individuals' social circumstances we 
have no means for understanding how perseverance or malevolence develops. Individuals 
are not always criminal or always meritorious (Black 15). Individuals exist within social 
structures which determine their social positioning and often their choices in life. Our 
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actions are directly determined by the social structure we reside within. This conclusion 
need not diminish desert in theories of justice, however, because our sense of what people 
should have is central to our understanding of what is just or fair. It is also reasonable 
conclude that individuals assume a certain degree of responsibility for their actions due to 
a concept of the free will of a person, an idea which we will return to in chapter two. We 
must determine a rational position from which individuals can legitimately deserve their 
reward or punishment. Individuals have different sets of opportunities based upon the 
social structures they exist within. Therefore, the goal of my thesis will be to show that 
individuals deserve a social structure that will foster opportunities for good outcomes, 
and that a society built upon this foundation can justify punishments. 
In the first chapter of my thesis I will unpack the various accounts of desert that 
focus on the individual. These will include deserts for both meritorious and reprehensible 
actions. The assumptions of these theories will be scrutinized and this will provide the 
framework for the following chapters. Prior literature has determined desert claims to 
exist in various canons or categories (Rescher 609, Sher 20-21). Nicholas Rescher has 
provided a useful set of canons for distributive deserts which include needs, social and 
economic utility, merit, and effort. Upon concluding that each canon is insufficient alone 
as a criterion of distributive justice, Rescher combines the noteworthy attributes of each 
into a new "canon of claims," (Rescher 609). The canon of claims embodies a principle 
of symmetry across criteria of distribution. As I discuss the various forms of individual 
desert bases and claims, I will utilize the philosophy of Rescher's canon of claims to 
argue that punishment and benefit exist together within a universe of claims to justice, 
and the balance of this universe depends upon the strength of opportunity in society. 
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Claims to punish disproportionately befall those residing in lower socioeconomic 
circumstances and it is my intention to show that said individuals have unfulfilled claims 
to greater opportunities leading to meritorious ends. I do not suggest that claims to punish 
are invalid, but I do aim to show that disproportionate criminality and punishment among 
certain sections of the population must be addressed with logical solutions. 
Personal desert is comprised of a complex network of bases and claims and 
requires a robust theoretical discourse. George Sher's contributions to this discourse are 
of particular significance because he has provided an intricate examination of the possible 
bases and claims for desert in terms of diligence, merit, virtue, diachronic fairness, 
punishment, and free action. He has also successfully refuted the traditional distributive 
theory, popularized by John Rawls, which holds that because people do not deserve their 
natural or inherited endowments, people cannot deserve the advantages that they create 
(Sher 23). Sher accomplished a counterargument to the Rawlsian position by displaying 
the importance of diligence and deliberation to bases and claims of desert. Sher's 
counterargument contends that people can liberate themselves to some degree from their 
inherited circumstances by investing their efforts into something they wish to achieve. 
Sustained efforts confer a value upon individual actions which they would otherwise 
lack. This suggests a degree of free action of which I am comfortable embracing in my 
thesis, but I intend to highlight some facets of determinism which perpetuate the need for 
symmetrical justice. For instance, a person born to social and economic disadvantage has 
limited opportunities to foster deliberate and diligent effort for any one productive cause, 
let alone the multiplicity of productive activities that are required of those residing in 
higher socioeconomic statuses. 
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Since my argument calls forth a broader understanding of the requirements of a 
just society, the second chapter will examine the prospects for a reconciliation of freedom 
and determinism. Freedom will be understood as freedom of the will under a Frankfurtian 
conception of the person (Frankfurt, 125-134). Determinism is the idea that humans are 
necessarily determined in their characteristics and abilities by both natural and social 
circumstances for which they cannot claim responsibility. These two notions of human 
behavior have been considered irreconcilable in theories of desert due to the fundamental 
disagreement between them, namely that humans are/are not deserving of the 
consequences of their actions. I evaluate the claims from both perspectives and come to a 
reasonable middle ground from which to develop my own hybrid theory of justice and 
desert. 
Once determinism and freedom have been reconciled, I will propose a theory of 
fair opportunities grounded in the empirical truths of modern capitalist societies. In the 
third chapter I will address the asymmetry of desert between retribution and distribution 
and embrace the Marxian challenge to traditional retributive and social contract theories 
of justice. I will not cast aside the assumptions about human rationality of the more 
traditional theories, but I hope to build upon them with a progressive motive to 
acknowledge empirically validated social realities of the modern world. Upon conclusion, 
my thesis will defend the idea of a just society built upon a principle of opportunities. 
This principle is somewhat similar to the Rawlsian difference principle insofar as it seeks 
to establish acceptable conditions for the least advantaged. The difference principle holds 
that, "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the 
greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions 
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open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity," (Rawls, A Theory, 72). 
Unlike the difference principle, the principle of opportunities posits that opportunities are 
distributive benefits which are deserved by the least advantaged members of society. 
Additionally, I am skeptical of the difference principle's acceptance of social and 
economic inequalities given that the "greatest expected benefit" may be insufficient for 
providing actual conditions of equality of opportunity. This status quo rationale will 
reinforce the asymmetry of desert, but in a capitalist framework this seems unjustifiable. I 
will reject the asymmetry in chapter three, but first I must examine the individual desert 




A great variety of claims are made about what individuals deserve. These claims 
are often based upon characteristics about the individual. The characteristics can be 
linked to the actions the individual takes or to the actions taken against the individual. 
Further still, deserved consequences can arise from no actions at all, but simply mere 
needs or qualifications of individuals. This chapter will examine the scope of individual 
desert claims and their bases as they function in contemporary capitalist democratic 
societies. I will frame the argument against asymmetry of desert between retribution and 
distribution in such societies later in this thesis, but first I must establish a comprehensive 
account of desert bases. 
The Value of Effort 
The efforts of an individual can be regarded as a basis for personal desert of some 
expected consequence. Individuals provide effort to achieve an outcome and often expect 
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the consequence of that outcome to be beneficial in some manner. Effort may be one of 
the easiest desert bases to defend because of the value it confers upon the individual's 
labor. George Sher constructed a case for diligent, sustained effort which expresses some 
of the unique characteristics of this desert base. First of all, diligent effort places a value 
upon a goal that it would otherwise lack (Sher, 1987). For instance, two students may 
hold the same goal of receiving a high mark on a test, but one may invest the requisite 
effort by studying long hours while the other procrastinates and only studies for several 
minutes right before the test is administered. The student who studied longer is often 
thought to be more deserving than his peer of a high mark on the test because his effort 
studying conferred value upon his goal. This value of sustained effort gives the 
individual's aspiration legitimacy and respectability. Before the individual begins work, 
she places a goal in mind and expects to accomplish it. Her having a goal and an 
expectation of accomplishment, however, is not sufficient for deserving the consequences 
of that goal. She must put forth effort in order to achieve her goal, and in doing so her 
work confers a value upon her desert claim. The extent of her accomplishment may not 
even be relevant to a discussion of what she deserved thereafter. Of course, her 
entitlement to the goal's consequence may be impacted by her completion of the task, but 
a discussion of entitlements will be left for later on. 
We often agree that an individual can deserve something in virtue of some 
characteristic of themselves, and effort is perhaps the most compelling characteristic of 
oneself. Sher argues that the diligent ought to succeed because "their sustained efforts are 
substantial investments of themselves—the ultimate source of value—in the outcomes 
they seek," (Sher, 1987). I agree with this thesis, but I think it may be useful to discuss 
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what precedes diligence in the actions of individuals. This kind of character is often 
manifested within particular circumstances containing the appropriate advantages and 
opportunities. The question of desert merits discussion of determinism and free action, a 
discussion that will occur in the pages to come, but here I must comment that what is 
often overlooked is that diligence is preceded by opportunity. This kind of opportunity 
refers to certain kinds of social capital which not everyone has access to, i.e. family and 
community values centered on education and civic participation, In his defense of the 
effort-confers-value thesis, Sher argues that individuals who have not worked hard 
because of incapacitation or lack of opportunity are regarded as unfortunate rather than 
deserving (Sher, 1987). On the contrary, I assert that although those lacking opportunity 
are unfortunate, they can also be considered deserving of opportunity insofar as their 
society has not delivered the circumstances conducive to equal opportunity (such as 
inadequate and unsound infrastructure and institutions in dilapidated neighborhoods 
containing extreme concentrated disadvantage). 
The opportunity to be able to put forth persistent and sustained effort is not 
universally shared by all individuals in their objectives. In capitalist societies, opportunity 
is touted as the foundation of the economic system, but the social realities of such 
contemporary societies reveal truths inconsistent with this naive assessment. For instance, 
an education may be more difficult for some to obtain than others, yet it is often 
necessary to have in order to enter into the middle class job market. Public schools lack 
funding to provide adequate, let alone quality, educational experiences, and most 
working-class and poor people are attending these institutions for their primary 
education. A child of a working-class family may desire to put forth persistent and 
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sustained effort to succeed in school, but the school itself lacks the resources to meet the 
needs of the inspired student. Here we see that the unequal distribution of opportunity can 
have an impact on effort, thus affecting deserved outcomes that would have been created 
by the effort claim that Sher defends. The student cannot reasonably be expected to exert 
effort into endeavors that she has limited or no access to because her secondary educators 
were unable to provide them (such as college preparatory courses, advanced curriculums, 
adequate counseling, etc). My contention here concerning opportunity will be the 
cornerstone of my thesis, so I will return to this more than once. Access to the kinds of 
advantages discussed above may not be necessary for individuals to exert effort, but this 
does not undermine the desert of opportunity which the principle seeks to establish. It is 
true that disadvantaged individuals may exert effort towards the kinds of successes 
described above. However, the relationship between the differential advantages that 
advantaged enjoy and the disproportionate criminality by the least advantaged suggests 
that legitimate effort-making abilities are linked to sufficient opportunities. 
Productivity and Contribution 
The value of effort can establish a basis for deserving something, but it does not 
account for those desert bases that may not arise from any amount of sustained effort at 
all. One may deserve to be acknowledged for his contribution or productivity even 
though he did not invest as much effort as others may have. Productivity and contribution 
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are desert bases that do not require diligent effort to maintain their normative force. 
Theories of desert in favor of contribution generally contend that individuals deserve 
rewards based upon their contributions. Relativity is not necessary to contribution as a 
desert base -for instance, one may be thought to be deserving of recognition for 
contribution to a charity and no consideration may be given to the relative amount of that 
contribution as compared to other contributors. Some donators may contribute more than 
others, and thus be thought of as more deserving of praise, but desert based in 
contribution does not require measures of relativity to establish normative force. 
Desert based in productivity, on the other hand, quite specifically relies on 
relativity to maintain its normative force. The amount one produces is measured relative 
to a set standard or the production rates of others. In the philosophical discourse on 
desert, productivity is often associated with market economies, a feature of capitalist 
societies, and thus it directly pertains to this discussion of asymmetry between desert in 
distribution and retribution in contemporary capitalist democracies. Owen McLeod 
provided a useful account of market valuation of contribution that states that "the wage 
one deserves for providing a service is equal to the free market value of that service," 
(McLeod, 273). McLeod finds numerous problems with this contention, chief among 
those being that market value will not always adequately reflect the array of skills, 
qualifications, and efforts that one puts into a service. Additionally, the market value may 
not reflect the genuine value of an object. For instance, fuel efficient vehicles, such as 
modest compacts, were once less appreciated because they lacked the frills of luxury 
sedans and sport-utility vehicles, thus their market value was lower due to the lack of 
demand for them. The modest compact cars of the past were more genuinely valuable 
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than luxury vehicles because of their diminished impact on the environment and their 
promotion of the sustainability of oil-based energies, but the market can be indifferent to 
such genuine value at certain times. This market value contention requires markets to be 
ideal or perfectly free markets, but markets have yet to accomplish this tremendous 
improbability. A theory of desert rooted in laissez-faire economics ignores such social 
realities as income inequities by gender and race. 
In addition to the inequities tied to social stratification, markets are also 
problematic due to the manipulations and restrictions by third parties. Productivity, in this 
sense, may be rendered irrelevant due to changing market forces. For example, a larger, 
wealthier manufacturer may be able to produce certain goods at a faster and cheaper rate 
than smaller businesses, thus rendering obsolete the productivity of those on the floor of 
the smaller manufacturing plants. Those workers in the smaller businesses had a claim to 
desert based upon productivity, but now their productivity is incomparable to that of the 
larger manufacturer who can employ not simply more individuals for less money, but can 
also afford machinery to skip several steps in the process involving manual labor. 
Nothing has changed with the smaller manufacturer, and yet now he would be considered 
less deserving on the productivity account. This may be an acceptable conclusion for free 
market theorists, but desert theorists must recognize the limitations of claims based solely 
in market value. Therefore, we need a broader conception of what people deserve based 
not simply in effort or productivity. In advance of effort and productivity, we need to 
consider the equality of opportunity in society. 
Contribution can be assessed both relatively and individually for determining the 
appropriation of deserved consequences. For instance, two graduate students could be 
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tasked with dividing up the labor of administering surveys for a qualitative research 
project. They are given three weeks to have results ready for analysis. One student 
distributes the surveys to the target subjects diligently and receives responses within a 
few days. The other student procrastinates, not receiving any responses until days before 
the deadline and is forced to submit only a portion of the amount she administered. One 
could reasonably argue that the student who contributed more value to the analysis phase 
deserves a better evaluation from the professor in charge. The product in question has no 
relative value to be determined by outside players, nor does the professor leading the 
project have any competitors to contend with. From the perspective of the two students 
involved, their respective contributions are the most compelling conduits through which 
their claims to be deserving of a good evaluation can pass. 
Since the opportunity was shared, and all else equal, there seems to be an 
appropriate basis for one student's claim to desert via contribution. Their relative 
(dis)advantages may also be taken into consideration. One student may lack the 
preparation skills or the intelligence quotient to adequately contribute in a manner equal 
to the other student. The individual claims to desert in this example are not undermined 
by such questions of relativity because the subjects in question are not immersed in an 
overtly competitive environment. Though each student hopes to obtain a high grade point 
average in order to compete in the job market later on, their immediate circumstance is 
not competitive in a capitalistic sense. If the goal is to balance desert in a capitalist 
framework, though, how can we apply it to an imperfect market context? The answer is 
to first provide equal opportunity, the extent to which will be explored later on, and then 
to examine desert claims in the context of a plurality of bases. It is likely the case that 
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societies will forever fall short of providing equal opportunities for everyone at all times, 
so we must operate under the assumption that non-ideal conditions will indefinitely 
persist. The most promising avenue towards a symmetrical system of justice leads us to 
the fair distribution of benefits and burdens, which I will address later in the chapter. 
Need 
Individual contribution and effort has a tendency to overshadow desert based 
upon circumstance. Need has been recognized as a reasonable qualification for the 
purposes of distributive justice, but whether necessity can confer desert upon individuals 
is somewhat less conclusive. Someone may need something, but does that mean that 
person deserves it? It seems better to say that it is good or appropriate that she has it; but 
the need does not seem the basis of moral merit. David Miller argues that need is 
"inappropriate as a basis of desert; being needy cannot make us deserving," (Miller, 95). 
The characteristics of need that disqualify it as an appropriate basis of desert are two-
fold; everyone has needs, until they are satisfied, and no one wishes to be needy or 
admires others for being needy (Miller, 95). This argument stems from Miller's broader 
discourse on the importance of keeping separate the claims of rights, deserts, and needs 
(Miller, 95). 
Need seems to exist outside of the domain of appropriate claims to desert, but 
Miller's argument does not sufficiently explain why this is the case. To afford deserts the 
elevated status, "highly regarded," may explain why desire is not sufficient on its own to 
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establish a basis of desert, but the question of whether need establishes desert still looms. 
For instance, individuals may desire a mode of treatment or an object, but unless they 
have fulfilled the relevant requisites or qualifications for having them they do not deserve 
said treatments or objects. These treatments or objects are highly regarded by those who 
desire them and are only deserved by those who attain the requisite achievements for 
having them. If there is a need for treatments or objects, however, there seems to be an 
alternate source of inherent value in those treatments or objects that would lower the 
requisites for having them. Consider the basic need for food shared by all people. Miller 
would argue that because everyone possesses this need, no one has an individual claim to 
deserve food. However, in a competitive economic environment, people have differential 
access to sources of income and thus may not be able to obtain adequate meals. Those 
who are disadvantaged in their abilities to provide themselves and their kin with 
sufficient sustenance deserve the opportunity to provide for this very basic necessity. 
The discussion of value was central to the assertion that effort is a basis of desert. 
Value seems to pervade the literature on desert, but it does so in a fractured manner. 
Diligent and sustained effort carries a different sort of value, in regards to deserved 
benefits, than productivity or meritorious action. Additionally, the persistence of effort or 
contribution towards mischievous ends would confer disvalue and perhaps even deserved 
punishment. Need confers an entirely different sort of value even still, yet the literature 
on desert has not addressed this issue as it has those above. 
The value underlying the essential treatments and objects that people need is 
inherent. When we talk about what people deserve, we often mean it is what they ought 
to have. We think it is a good thing when they receive what they deserve and a bad thing 
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when they do not. The same logic can follow for needs. Yet needed treatments and 
objects are argued as undeserved because the needy are not active in some form requisite 
for an appropriate claim. People deserve objects or treatments in virtue of a variety of 
actions, such as effort, productivity, or wrongful actions. Need is a trait or a characteristic 
of individuals and cannot function to establish desert directly. Traits such as preferences 
or beliefs do not establish desert (Miller, 95). However, the things that people need are of 
such value that it is necessary to afford people at least the opportunity to have what they 
need. The same may not be said of people's beliefs or preferences, traits that do not 
establish desert. 
Out of this principle of fairness, we can assume that people deserve opportunity; 
that they ought to have opportunities and that not having opportunities is a bad thing. We 
will return to fairness again later on, but it was necessary here to the discussion of need 
and desert because it isn't examined as often or in such depth as the more recognizable, 
diminutive aspects of need. 
Merit and Virtue 
As the discussion proceeds further from actions and closer to traits and 
characteristics, the claims of desert become increasingly difficult to defend. Merit is a 
contending desert basis that embodies both the normative force of actions and debatable 
worth of traits and characteristics. Meritorious actions appeal to our sense of desert 
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because of their outstanding qualities. Those who act above and beyond the median of 
expectation are believed to deserve some praise or better treatment. In this sense, 
excellent performances or acts of heroism are examples of actions that acquire greater 
value. This value is not uniformly applied to claims of desert, however, because it can 
exist in two separate realms depending upon the circumstances of the actions. George 
Sher divides the value of merit into two realms; moral and nonmoral merit (Sher, 109). 
Those actions which are morally meritorious appeal to our sense of good will and can 
include gestures of kindness, charitable donations, and acts of heroism to name a few. 
Nonmoral merit arises from actions such as athletic performances, artistic or musical 
ensembles, and academic or professional achievements. 
Actions are deemed meritorious based on norms and standards, and those actions 
whose intentions are nonmoral derive the entirety of their normative force from norms 
and standards. Morally meritorious actions are inherently good and do not rely 
necessarily on norms and standards to achieve normative force. An act of heroism is not 
considered to be the standard course of action in any circumstance of extreme danger. For 
this reason, an act of heroism is applauded as a morally outstanding action. Acts of 
nonmoral merit, such as exceptional athletic performances, are judged in reference to a 
standard of athleticism. Here we can attach no moral value because the actions are not in 
response to an extreme circumstance or immediate threat. Nonetheless, outstanding 
athletic performances are at least worthy of nonmoral merit. The same applies to most 
sets of actions that are above standardized or institutionalized expectations. Not all 
standardized or institutionalized expectations have a nonmoral value. In fact, some 
institutionalized expectations may be immoral, such as a Nazi soldier's orders to execute 
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Jewish men, but within that institutional setting the Nazi soldier would probably receive 
merit for his actions from his supervisors. Our sense of justice would reject the notion 
that he deserves merit for his actions; in fact most would be outraged at such a 
suggestion. Simply because an action lacks a moral basis, however, does not mean its 
merits are not deserving of a rewarding outcome. Nonmoral merit can confer desert of 
reward. 
The prizes that nonmorally meritorious competitors deserve are based in a similar 
set of expectations or standards. An outstanding athlete may expect to have greater 
recognition for her accomplishments. Her claim to desert has been argued to be grounded 
in veracity and fidelity (Sher, 118-119). The same can be said of competitors who are not 
athletically superior but manage to be victorious through some instance of fortune or 
advantage. Sher provides the example of a foot race in which the superior runner tears a 
shoe and this misfortune affords his competitor victory. The losing runner has no 
complaint against the winner receiving the prize, but people may be inclined to say that 
the loser really deserved to win (Sher, 118). Regardless of what we believe the loser 
deserves, we cannot strip the winner of his desert of the prize for actually having won the 
race. We have two competing claims to desert here, but only one can be sufficient for the 
reward. The demands of veracity are the justification for rewarding the lesser athlete with 
the prize for winning the race. 
Not all desert-claims based on merit are justified by the demands of veracity. 
People with great ideas may deserve to be heard, superior political candidates may 
deserve to be elected, authors of outstanding books may deserve to be recognized, and 
scientists who discover cures for diseases may deserve honors or awards (Sher, 129). 
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Sher asserts that such claims of desert are really disguised hypothetical imperatives. That 
we believe any of the aforementioned are deserving of anything is really our expression 
of admiration or gratitude. Nothing is owed to the meritorious parties, but we feel that 
others would "do well to respond to them in certain ways," (Sher, 130). These non-
justificatory deserts are rooted in our tendencies to project our internal values onto the 
world. This aspect of Sher's account of merit-based desert is linked to the discussion 
about desert and institutions carried on by Julian Lamont and Owen McLeod, which I 
will explore in great detail in Chapter 2. 
Earlier I stated that morally meritorious actions are inherently good and they do 
not require standards to be judged as such. As Sher put it, "There are no virtue contests," 
(Sher, 132). People's talents and abilities do not correlate with their propensities for good 
will. Those who are virtuous are not competitively so, and often their intentions are not 
self-evident. A person's good will is a trait that appeals to greater moral principles. To 
follow a path of virtue requires a moral compass. This does not mean that all virtuous 
people always act morally, but it does indicate that in order to act virtuously one must 
possess at least a certain degree of morality. Since morality is a set of attitudes, 
dispositions, and beliefs determined by factors largely outside of our control, our 
tendency to act virtuously is not something we can be said to be fully responsible for. 
Because of this truism, John Rawls has argued that virtue cannot be a basis for 
distribution (Sher, 139). Sher's counterargument contends that those who are virtuous 
have conferred greater worth upon themselves through their sustained efforts and desires. 




So far I have discussed the bases of deserved benefits (prizes, awards, 
compensation, etc,). Deserved punishment arises out of wrongful acts, but wrongdoers 
are not actively seeking their own punishment as others may seek the benefits from the 
actions listed above. Moreover, the punishments we administer are normally 
impermissible acts outside of the context of punishment. Therefore, deserved punishment 
requires a substantial justification that will not be as easily attained as the justifications 
for those desert bases discussed above. Classical theorists have discussed punishment in 
great detail, but their theories fell short of any strong arguments about deserved 
punishment (Sher, 74). The Kantian perspective on punishment holds that the offender 
perpetrates evil upon himself when he commits crimes against others, thus punishment 
serves to balance the scales of justice. This is an appeal to rights and justice, but it 
doesn't answer the inquiry of whether punishment is deserved. Kant's retributive 
framework has been expanded by contemporary theorists in a few major ways. First, we 
can justify punishment "by the value it brings" rather than the moral obligation it must 
maintain (Sher, 71). In this sense, matching punishment to wrongdoing produces value. 
According to Sher, this value has no defense because it is simply a restatement of what 
retributive justice "needs to explain," (Sher, 72). 
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A second approach to retributive desert promotes the ideas that punishment 
safeguards our rights, that the wrongdoer forfeits his right not to be punished, and 
punishment is an obligation of the law (Sher, 72). These assertions are rooted in a 
systemic model of justice that adheres to legal principles. According to those opposed to 
such a retributive account, the logical rebuttal is that there is no reason to punish those 
who have broken no laws (Sher, 73). Additionally, the assertion that the wrongdoer 
forfeits his right not to be punished is rooted in institutionally-based contract theory. 
Retributive theorists in support of this assertion, however, do not construe it in terms of 
practical legal institutions, but merely as a pre-institutional moral notion. Therefore, in 
my attempt to seek a justification for retributive desert I find it necessary to explore 
contemporary retributive theories that may avoid the inadequacies of past ones. 
Herbert Morris' retributive argument is perhaps the most compelling of the 
modern era. Morris' argument exists in two parts, with the second providing the most 
appropriate conclusion for the purpose of establishing retributive desert. First, Morris 
points out that "any society that wishes to forego punishment, but also wishes to control 
behavior, will be pressed to regard undesirable acts as forms of pathology," (Sher, 75). 
This means that the alternative to punishment is therapy and the perpetrator is viewed as 
a patient in need of treatment instead of a blameworthy criminal in need of punishment. 
Morris takes issue with the therapeutic system because he believes it degrades humans to 
the "status of animals or things," (Sher, 75). The initial, anti-Hegelian conclusion drawn 
by Morris is problematic for the purposes of balancing retributive and distributive justice 
because it takes the position of classical retributivism that punishment upholds human 
dignity. The most punitive measures taken by states against their criminal citizens are 
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purely backward-looking in principle. Since the goal is to balance retributive and 
distributive deserts, we must move beyond both backward- and- forward looking 
principles. 
The second part of Morris' retributive argument looks beyond both backward-
and forward-looking principles by appealing to a sense of equilibrium. This aspect of the 
Morris' approach is essentially what provides the foundation for a balance of retributive 
and distributive deserts. Morris contends that punishment is just because it "distributes 
benefits and burdens fairly," (Sher, 76). This distribution of benefits and burdens is 
achieved through punishment by removing the advantages that criminals enjoy which 
most others have refrained from. Grounded in fairness, retributivism seems more 
acceptable to our contemporary sense of justice. However, distributive theory must adopt 
the same foundational equilibrium or else the scales of justice, in the Kantian sense, will 
incline more to one side than the other (Sher, 70). In the following chapters, I will 
examine the possibilities of establishing the equilibrium of distributive desert. My thesis 
will assert that punishment can be justified when the fair distribution of benefits and 
burdens has been achieved in the distributive sense of justice. 
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CHAPTER II 
RECONCILING DETERMINISM AND FREE ACTION 
At the heart of the discussion about desert, a debate has persisted which has 
separated retributive and distributive theorists due to their seemingly irreconcilable 
difference of opinion. Central to this debate is the question of whether individuals act 
freely and autonomously or according to their inherited or socially determined traits and 
abilities. In respect to desert, retributive theorists generally hold the position that 
individuals are autonomous in nature and they should be held responsible for the 
consequences of their actions. Conversely, distributive theorists argue that individuals are 
shaped by their inherited and/or social and economic circumstances, and cannot claim to 
deserve anything outright. 
For the purposes of this thesis, we will consider the retributive perspective to be 
free action theory and the distributive perspective to be determinist theory. Between these 
two opposing factions, a theoretical middle-ground has developed which embraces the 
arguments from both perspectives. Perhaps it is possible to discern what parts of an 
individual's actions are self-determined and what parts are socially determined. The 
prospects for a resolution to this conflict are meager due to the intricacies of the problem, 
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but the moral significance of desert in theories of justice demands a thorough inspection 
of the possibilities. Moreover, I must adopt a sound conception of the relationship 
between determinism and free action if I am to establish equilibrium between retributive 
and distributive deserts in society. Compatibilism, the assertion that free will and 
determinism do both exist and are in fact compatible, will be the foundation for my 
proposal in the third chapter. First, I will examine the arguments from both the 
compatibilists, such as Harry Frankfurt, and the incompatibilists, such as John Rawls, and 
will conclude that Frankfurtian compatibilism holds the consistent and compelling 
argument which I will adopt for the foundation of my thesis. 
Free Action and Desert 
Freedom of action is the ability to do what one wants to do. All living things, 
when unrestricted, can demonstrate the ability to do what they want. A rabbit can sprint 
in any direction in a field that it may want to. A man can go for a walk down the street to 
take a break from life's chores. The difference between the man and the rabbit, as 
explained by Harry Frankfurt in his Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, is 
first-and second-order desires (Frankfurt, 125). First-order desires can consist of the 
straightforward and usually necessary desires to eat, sleep, and be comfortable. All 
animals possess these and are often free to act on them when possible. Humans differ 
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from all other animals, however, in that they can choose to not fulfill first-order desires. 
Other animals generally act on their first-order desires without any deeper inquiry. 
Humans can weigh the costs and benefits of certain first-order desires and may adopt 
second-order desires based on the options presented by the first-order. For instance, a 
student may desire to go to the beach, but she might also desire to get some work done on 
a research paper. A second-order desire is formed from the first two options and the 
student may decide against going to the beach in order to finish the research paper on 
time. However, people may have second-order desires without wanting to act on them. 
If the student has the second-order desire to finish the paper on time, she must 
make this desire her will and commit to the necessary action. This is called the second-
order volition (Frankfurt, 125). Freedom of the will is essential to the formation of 
second-order volitions. Free will is the ability to be free to want what one wants 
regardless of whether one may actually be free to have what one wants. Even when 
deprived of the freedom of action, people can maintain the freedom of will. People can be 
free to want what they want even when they are not free to do what they want. If our will 
is taken away, does that undermine moral responsibility for our actions? According to 
Frankfurt, a person may be morally responsible for having done something even though 
his will was not free at the time he did it (Frankfurt, 133). Moral responsibility requires 
commitment to action. Determinism is not inconsistent with this requirement. It can be 
the case that forces outside of a person's control will lead to the freedom or restriction of 
their actions or wills, but this does not undermine the moral responsibility that each 
person holds for their actions. It does entail, however, that others may be morally 
responsible for their actions as well. 
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A useful example to illustrate this point, which Frankfurt himself employs in his 
literature, is that of two drug addicts; one willing and the other unwilling. The first is said 
to be acting of free will. The willing drug addict's will is not free, however, because his 
addiction maintains a desire within him to take the drug "whether or not he wants this 
desire to constitute his will," (Frankfurt, 134). His moral responsibility for taking the 
drug does not entail that he "was in a position to have whatever will he wanted," 
(Frankfurt, 133). What Frankfurt means is that our moral responsibility for our actions 
remains intact regardless of the freedom of our will. The willing drug addict in 
Frankfurt's example has chosen to keep his desire for the drug effective by choosing the 
second-order desire of taking the drug (as opposed to the second-order desire of 
abstaining), thus he remains morally responsible for taking the drug even though his free 
will has been compromised by his addiction. The unwilling drug addict, on the other 
hand, has conflicting first-order desires. He desires the drug yet also wants to discontinue 
his use simultaneously. He may be inclined to believe he is not morally responsible for 
taking the drug because his addiction is so powerful that it overcomes his own will. 
According to Frankfurt, the unwilling addict "identifies himself, however, through the 
formation of a second-order volition, with one rather than the other of his conflicting 
first-order desires," (Frankfurt, 130). Therefore, though he had wanted to do otherwise, 
he was moved to take the drug and should be considered responsible for doing so. 
Concerns about the degree of his freedom and free will are irrelevant to the discussion of 
his moral responsibility. 
Frankfurt makes a strong case for the separation of moral responsibility, free 
action, and free will. Fundamental to his discourse is the assertion that individuals can be 
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morally responsible for their actions regardless of the freedom of their will. It seems 
necessary, for the purposes of balancing retributive and distributive deserts, to afford 
individuals as many options as possible for the formation of second-order volitions that 
produce benefits rather than punishments. This means that all persons should have a 
wide range of first-order desires to choose from in order to satisfy the Frankfurtian 
conception of a free will. 
If a person only has the first-order desires of a criminal, it may very well be the 
case that he lacks the freedom to have the will that he wants. For instance, a poor 
individual may not have the institutional access to gain resources sufficient to feed his 
family. He is constrained in his ability to have the will that he may want because of the 
financial difficulties he faces. In a desperate attempt to obtain quick cash, he commits 
armed robbery at a local gas station and is sent to prison. Though he is morally 
responsible for his actions because he made armed robbery his will, his will was not free 
because his responsibility to feed his family was urgent and his available options for 
income were extremely limited. He may have wanted the will to have a legal income, but 
he could not have the will that he wanted because he was under the pressure to feed his 
family and without any legal means to do so. His formation of a second-order volition to 
commit armed robbery consisted of two competing first-order desires; the urgent desire to 
feed his family and the pressing desire to avoid prison. Though he chose the former out 
of desperation and impulsivity, he identified himself with that action and withdrew from 
the latter. He acted freely, but as Frankfurt notes, "it is a mistake to believe that someone 
acts freely only when he is free to do whatever he wants or that acts of his own free will 
only if his will is free," (Frankfurt, 133). According to our Frankfurtian conception of the 
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person, the armed robber in our example was not free. Again, this does not excuse him of 
his actions, for which he remains morally responsible, but it does encourage the question 
of whether he should have been able to have the will that he wanted. The distribution of 
wages, awards, and prizes all seem to hinge upon the availability of opportunity, but 
opportunity is conceived of by desert theorists as something that can be deserved by those 
who satisfy the conditions of any of the bases mentioned in the first chapter which also 
afford wages, awards, and prizes. My assertion is that opportunity is deserved in advance 
of the fruits gained through sustained labor, meritorious action, production, and 
contribution. Since I acknowledge a partial significance of free will on behalf of 
criminals, however, I cannot deny that they deserve the punishments that they receive. 
Not all deserved outcomes are necessarily just, and not all just outcomes are necessarily 
deserved. Therefore, a punishment may be deserved of a criminal but this does not 
diminish his claim to justice in the distributive sense based upon need. 
The freedom of the will, as conceived by Frankfurt, shows us that humans have 
the ability to identify second-order desires and make them their volitions. This ability to 
enjoy a freedom of the will requires the availability of many second-order desires for the 
formation of second-order volitions. Opportunity is integral in establishing and 
maintaining freedom of the will. Within the Frankfurtian conception, opportunity is the 
vehicle for second-order volitions to become the will of the individual. 
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Determinism and the Rejection of Desert 
The principal philosopher of determinist theory, John Rawls, denies the relevance 
of desert to distributive theory. His famous contention is as follows: 
"It seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered judgments that no one 
deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments, any more than one deserves 
one's initial starting place in society. The assertion that a man deserves the superior 
character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his abilities is equally 
problematic; for his character depends in large part upon fortunate family and social 
circumstances for which he can claim no credit. The notion of desert seems not to apply 
to these cases." (Rawls, 159). 
Rawls' attack on desert is based upon the assumption that individuals cannot 
claim complete responsibility for their actions and character traits because they are, in 
effect, caused by inherited and social circumstances. People are in part a product of their 
lineages and social circumstances, but Rawls' contention is that we cannot affirmatively 
separate people from those influential factors enough to discern whether or not they are 
deserving of the benefits they achieve or are rewarded with. 
An important counterargument to Rawls' rejection of desert is Sher's value theses 
about effort and virtue. Effort and virtue confer value onto an individual action which can 
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be recognized independently of inheritance or social circumstance. As outlined in the 
previous chapter, Sher contends that individuals "may acquire desert by working hard, 
acting wrongly, behaving virtuously, performing heroic acts, and so on," (Sher, 36). 
These desert bases are not rooted in competition, whereas the Rawlsian rejection of desert 
considers only those attributes relevant to competition. The underpinning point of the 
Rawlsian argument is that no one can deserve anything that is acquired through the 
differential advantages for which they can claim no responsibility. 
There seems to be a disconnection between those naturally endowed or inherited 
advantages and the advantages created by sustained effort and virtuousness. Though I 
cannot say for certain how Rawls would answer, I do believe his response would hold 
that individuals cannot be said to be fully responsible for the better character that enables 
them to engage in diligent effort or virtuous actions. Frankfurt's conception of human 
free will offers a reason to be suspicious of Rawls' assertions about the "better character" 
of individuals. People are capable of choosing between competing alternatives, or first-
order desires, and often make second-order desires based upon the alternatives at their 
disposal. The ability to create second-order desires for ourselves and then convert those 
into our second-order volitions demonstrates that we have a certain amount of discretion 
in our actions. Unfortunately, it may be too difficult a task to separate the part of our 
actions and traits that is a natural or social construct and the part that is of our own will 
(Moriarty, 524). Nevertheless, there is sufficient reason to believe that humans have a 
degree of control in forming their desires and converting them to volitions, thus partially 
constructing their will. As Frankfurt notes, freedom of the will can only be achieved 
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when we are able to want what we want and do what we want. Therefore, the amount of 
opportunity we have at our disposal will provide the greatest measure of our free will. 
Rawls' perspective on retributive justice affords a greater degree of responsibility 
to individuals for their actions. This inconsistency in his argument has been highlighted 
by several previous authors. Since it is my specific intention to reject the asymmetry of 
desert between distributive and retributive justice, however, the inconsistency provides a 
useful theoretical representation of the unjustified asymmetry. I will delay my argument 
against the asymmetry until the following chapter. Beforehand, it is necessary to 
reconcile the differences between determinism and freedom to a find a common ground 
for the acceptable rejection of asymmetry and proposal of a new path forward. 
A Reconciliation of Determinism and Freedom 
As I stated above, there is sufficient reason to believe that humans are capable of 
separating themselves from their social and inherited circumstances. A few of the least 
advantaged have worked to overcome the hurdles that prevent the majority from 
succeeding, such as tuition expenses, racial and ethnic discrimination, and poor quality 
infrastructure. This statement, however, is not meant to detract from the often blatantly 
obvious impacts that social and inherited circumstances have upon individuals in their 
actions and traits. Our task must be to establish how we are to understand individual 
actions and traits as partially molded by inheritances and social positions and partially by 
free will. 
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A useful example to begin with is that of college admissions. Prospective students 
are judged often on a diverse set of criteria for their admission into colleges and 
universities. Since the end of formal segregation in the United States, colleges and 
universities have become more sensitive to the concerns of underprivileged minority 
communities. In the process of evaluating students for potential admission into their 
programs, colleges and universities will consider the ethnic background of the students 
applying. These institutions attempt to diversify their student bodies by accepting more 
minority students each year. Here it may seem we have an example of individual desert 
based solely upon social and inherited circumstances. The minority students are viewed 
as deserving of special consideration for the purpose of alleviating the societal ills created 
a generation ago and to create more diverse communities of students on campuses. 
However, we may also consider the socially-determined statuses of minority students to 
render entitlement to special considerations rather than desert of them. Entitlement may 
serve as a more appropriate political conception for the purposes of distributive justice 
than moral desert. This is a fixed point of clarification on the concept of desert in 
distributive justice in Rawls' Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, where Rawls improves 
upon his previous work, A Theory of Justice. We will return to entitlement soon, but for 
now I will explain the significance of this example in greater detail. 
Affirmative action policies in college admissions provide a practical example of a 
benefits-and-burdens account as applied to distributive justice (Sher, 82). Sher's benefits-
and-burdens account is rooted in a principle of diachronic fairness, which states that 
"with respect to each class of commensurable benefits and burdens, each person's total of 
those benefits and burdens should, over time, be roughly equal to that of each other 
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person," (Sher, 92). Desert theorists have been much more comfortable applying this 
principle to retributive justice because it is easier to arrive at a conclusion about what 
extra benefits criminals take advantage of and what burdens they circumvent to have 
those advantages. It is not so simple to discern what burdens people have 
disproportionately experienced relative to others in the past and what benefits they 
deserve in the future as a result of such alleged past injustices. 
Colleges and universities do not take a simplistic approach to the admission of 
students. Though their concerns of diversifying their student body do enter into their 
decision-making process, admissions offices have the primary goal seeking out the 
exceptional students with personal achievements and successes present in their 
applications. Therefore, each student admitted is considered to be entitled to their 
admission based on their prior meritorious actions. This example provides a unique 
intersection of determinism and free action in individual desert, where both the 
determinist and free will features of individual traits are considered. The institutions 
themselves may not have a mentality to award candidates admission based upon their 
"deserving" it, but we are inclined to believe that meritorious actions are deserving of 
recognition. Though meritorious students do deserve admission to college, all prospective 
students deserve the fair treatment. This model seems appropriate to our discussion 
because we are seeking a way to reconcile determinism and freedom in order to reject the 
asymmetry of desert across retributive and distributive theories of justice. It uniquely 
entails a benefits-and-burdens approach to distributive justice with specific attention paid 
to the principle of diachronic fairness. 
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Prospective students from an ethnic minority are not absolved of the basic 
requirements of the application process, which means that they must, on their own merits, 
provide sufficient evidence of their willingness to succeed academically. After having 
displayed such criteria, said applicants are then given special consideration based on their 
ethnicity if the deciding institutions are in fact sensitive to the demands of a diverse 
student body. The students are no less deserving of their admission than their 
counterparts from the racial majority due to this special consideration because they 
display requisite characteristics, achievements, and traits, but are perhaps more deserving 
due to the principle of diachronic fairness. Again, the institutions may not necessarily 
consider the candidates "deserving," but their methods of achieving diverse student 
bodies implies a principle of diachronic fairness akin to that of Sher's conception. It 
would seem upon my simple, nevertheless valid, understanding of this process that there 
exists a benefits-and-burdens account in distributive justice that applies the principle of 
diachronic fairness. Through this rough example, a reconciliation of determinism and 
freedom seems much more attainable for the purposes of distributive justice. Desert 
emerges as not simply a sufficient but perhaps even necessary concern of distributive 
justice when aligned with concerns of fairness. 
Though determinism cannot successfully rule out desert as a criterion of 
distributive justice, it does signal an important feature of human behavior that needs to be 
considered foremost by retributive theory which embraces desert under the moral notion 
of free will. Humans are uniquely shaped by their social environments and family 
inheritances. Opportunities that exist for some may not exist for others in any practical, 
attainable sense. Wealthy children attain cultural capital through the experiences they can 
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afford to have. For instance, wealthy children often have access to hierarchically elevated 
institutions, such as private schools activities, and organizations, which are simply not 
available to less fortunate children (Lareau, 1-6). A child cultivated in the upper-middle 
class will enter adulthood equipped with the social tools necessary for productive 
interactions in a professional setting. These tools include proper communication skills, 
knowledge of institutions and how they function, and a general sense of entitlement to the 
fruits of upper-middle class life. Poor children are not so privy to such knowledge 
because of their constrained lives. Financial hurdles are set too high for many parents to 
overcome, which leads to restricted choices later in poor children's lives. For these 
children, their low status is determined by their lack of resources and cultural capital, and 
this status becomes reinforced if they choose criminal paths to financial gains. 
There are exist admirable cases of impoverished people rising above their 
circumstances and legally succeeding. As it is to be understood, people's actions and 
traits are only partially determined by their social circumstances and inheritances. The 
examples of those who stray from the norm are a testament to the Frankfurtian 
conception of free will as discussed earlier on. The vast majority of cases, however, lead 
many to believe that we cannot be deserving of anything in the distributive sense because 
we are so often the product of our inheritances and circumstances. 
Rawls states that, "no one deserves his place in the distribution of natural assets 
any more than one deserves his initial starting place in society," (Rawls, 162). As noted 
in the discussion of Sher's thesis earlier, moral desert may be afforded to those who put 
forth conscientious effort, a precept that is perhaps underappreciated by Rawls. The 
Rawlsian response, however, argues that even "the effort a person is willing to make is 
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influenced by his natural abilities and skills and the alternatives open to him," (Rawls, 
162). This argument is quite valid and it leaves us in a peculiar moral position somewhere 
between determinism and freedom which is perhaps too difficult to pinpoint. We must 
acknowledge the fundamental importance of equality of opportunity to a theory of a just 
society. As Rawls states, "in a well-ordered society we usually do deserve... things, when 
desert is understood as entitlement earned under fair conditions," (Rawls, 78). Desert of 
distributive shares, according to Rawls, may exist at some point later our lives, but only if 
it is morally arbitrary and considered as entitlement. For instance, an executive at a large 
company may be entitled to his position, but his position is not awarded to him by an 
appeal to moral desert since his abilities are a product of social and inherited 
circumstances for which he can claim no credit. Rawls does not reject desert outright. His 
goal is to establish a practicable political conception of justice. Conceiving of desert as 
entitlement allows him to do so. 
This conclusion seems unsatisfactory. Opportunity precedes other distributive 
shares and carries a moral value that helps to distinguish just and unjust societies. It 
originates the entitlements people claim in a well-ordered society which Rawls has 
argued for. Even he acknowledges that desert is understood as entitlement "earned under 
fair conditions," which would imply his advocacy for equal opportunities. Without 
opportunities to make effort, be productive, gain merit, or act virtuously, people cannot 
claim to be entitled to or deserving of many things in the distributive sense of justice. In 
the following chapter, I will argue that a principle of fairness built upon equal 
opportunities for all citizens is essential to a just society. It is my intention to show that 
people deserve sufficient opportunities, and if they are afforded such opportunities the 
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systems of distributive and retributive justice will be balanced. In a Utopian sense, though 
impracticable as it may be, a just society built upon this principle would have no need for 
penal law because the citizens would take advantage of the fair opportunities for 
distributive shares that would be available to them. It is not my intention to argue for a 
Utopian society, but simply a more just one. Therefore, the closer we come to fair and 
equal opportunity in society, the more just our society will be. Punishments can be 
legitimated to all citizens based upon the high availability of opportunities for distributive 
shares in such a society. 
This conception of society relies upon the assumption that the realms of 
distributive and retributive justice are interconnected by a higher normative order. I view 
retributive and distributive justice as having a shared stake in the overall fairness of a 
society. This is based upon the empirical realities of a modern capitalist society. It is here 
that I depart from previous theories of justice. Determinism and freedom are reconcilable 
because both contain a degree of normative force that cannot be denied completely. Each 
of these two notions of human actions and characteristics has a degree a validity as well 
as its proven limitations. For instance, the Frankfurtian conception of a human being 
appeals to our individual sense of freedom and free will, whereas the Rawlsian 
perspective appeals to our understanding that humans are in fact heavily influenced by 
factors outside of their own control. The reconciliation of determinism and freedom is 
only the first step in establishing equilibrium of retributive and distributive justice. 
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CHAPTER III 
TOWARDS A PRINCIPLE OF OPPORTUNITIES 
Having established the major bases of desert and provided a reasonable 
reconciliation of determinism and freedom, I can now propose a way to balance 
retribution and distribution in society. As I have argued throughout this thesis, 
opportunity is a fundamentally important precursor to any claims to distributive desert 
bases (such as desert based in effort, productivity, or merit). The opportunity to act with 
productive effort towards a meritorious goal must be afforded to all people in order to 
counter the claims to deserved punishment. Active and productive members of society 
are usually those with greater opportunities. Criminals, especially violent ones, most 
often exist in socially and economically inferior positions in society. Therefore, attention 
must be paid to the sufficient distribution of opportunities to those who exist lowest on 
the socioeconomic hierarchy. A strong theory of justice must be rooted in social reality. 
Much of the previous work on desert has ignored social realities surrounding the issue. 
Theorists often make statements about the role of desert injustice without much 
consideration of the grave inequalities and inequities that exist in society. My intention 
here is to establish a theory of desert and justice that acknowledges social realities and 
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proposes a balance of retribution and distribution in society under a distinct principle of 
fairness. Opportunity is simply the vehicle for this proposal to operate within. 
The Asymmetry of Retribution and Distribution 
As it was noted at the end of the preceding chapter, retribution and distribution 
have a shared stake in the overall justice of society. I prefer to consider distributive 
deserts to be as morally enforceable as retributive deserts are, but there must be a basis 
for all deserts in order for them to carry normative force. This is essentially the point of 
consideration that divides my principle of justice from that of past distributive theorist, 
John Rawls. Rawls supports an imbalance of retribution and distribution in society 
because he does not view the two notions of justice as converse or even related. 
Moreover, he rejects moral desert in favor of entitlement for the purposes of distributive 
justice whilst embracing moral desert for the purposes of retribution. These conclusions 
about Rawlsian political philosophy are born out of specific, yet somewhat elusive 
statements made by Rawls in A Theory of Justice. 
"It is true that in a reasonably well-ordered society those who are punished for violating 
just laws have normally done something wrong. This is because the purpose of criminal law is to 
uphold basic natural duties, those which forbid us to injure persons in their life and limb, or to 
deprive them of their liberty and property, and punishments are to serve this end. They are not 
simply a scheme of taxes and burdens designed to put a price on certain forms of conduct and in 
this way to guide men's conduct for mutual advantage. It would be far better if the acts prescribed 
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by penal statutes were never done. Thus a propensity to commit such acts is a mark of bad 
character, and in a just society legal punishments will only fall upon those who display these 
faults," (Rawls, 163). 
"It is clear that the distribution of economic and social advantages is entirely different. 
These arrangements are not the converse, so to speak, of the criminal law, so just as the one 
punishes certain offenses, the other rewards moral worth... To think of distributive and 
retributive justice as converses of one another is completely misleading and suggests a different 
justification for distributive shares than the one they in fact have," (Rawls, 163-164). 
From these statements we can make two valid inferences; 1) Rawls sees criminal 
action as a display of one's inferior moral character, thus retribution is a morally justified 
response to such actions and, 2) Rawls is not willing to view distribution as the converse 
of retribution because the distribution of economic and social advantages should not be 
considered rewards on the basis of moral worth such as retribution is punishment on the 
basis of moral desert. Rawls delivers an apparent inconsistency in his argument here 
which has been recognized by previous authors, namely Michael Sandel. Sandel 
inquires, "Since under the veil of ignorance, none can know whether he shall have the 
misfortune to be born into the unfavorable social and family circumstances that lead to a 
life of crime, why would the parties not adopt a kind of difference principle for 
punishments as well as distributive shares, and agree, in effect, to regard the distribution 
of natural and social liabilities as a common burden?" (Sandel, 183). Rawls opposes 
moral desert in distributive justice because, as he claims, none can be deserving of the 
fortunate natural and social circumstances he is born into. In agreement with Sandel I 
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must ask, would this not carry over to moral desert in retributive justice as well, where 
none can be deserving of the unfortunate natural and social circumstances he is born 
into? This inquiry presupposes the idea that criminality is a derivative of socioeconomic 
disadvantage. It is here that ground my principle of justice in social reality. 
In a just society, retribution would be the converse of distribution. If fair 
opportunities were to be afforded to a sufficient degree, moral desert in punishment 
would be legitimated to all members of such a fair society. As is currently the case in 
capitalist democracies, there is a disproportionate share of economic opportunities held 
by those in higher socioeconomic positions. Access to social and economic institutions, 
which foster the knowledge, skills, and abilities to obtain legal economic incomes, are 
limited to an opulent minority of the populations of capitalist democracies. This is not to 
say that those of lower socioeconomic positions are completely blockaded from accessing 
such institutions, but the means to do so are greatly reduced by the lack of opportunities 
afforded to them. For instance, a person raised in a circumstance of socioeconomic 
disadvantage is unlikely to attend reputable institutions of higher education due to a 
number of factors. The price of attending such institutions is far beyond the meager 
means of someone such as this. To obtain scholarships and grants would entail a fair 
degree of knowledge and abilities which are unlikely fostered in environments of 
socioeconomic disadvantage. Furthermore, the acquisition of a meritorious transcript and 
a resume of involvement in activities revered by the upper-class are frustrated causes for 
those of socioeconomic disadvantage. For instance, parents of children living in 
disadvantaged are likely over-burdened by low-paying jobs with long working hours, 
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thus reducing the time they have to spend tutoring their children and transporting them to 
various extracurricular activities. 
If sufficient opportunities were afforded, such as those which elude our 
socioeconomically disadvantaged example above, reasonable expectations of members of 
a just society would be met and punishments would be grounded in moral desert for those 
who choose not to take hold of the sufficient opportunities supplied. To think of 
distribution and retribution as converses, therefore, should not be misleading. Rawls' 
rejection of the moral basis of distributive shares seems unreasonable, for if we are to 
reject their moral basis for the reasons he does we would have to reject the moral basis of 
retribution as well. That conclusion seems altogether impracticable and even nonsensical. 
Therefore, we must accept a moral basis for the distribution of economic and social 
advantages and look toward a theory of justice that balances retributive and distributive 
deserts. 
A Principle Grounded in Empirical Truths 
My argument carries the intention of acknowledging the empirical realities of 
capitalistic societies. Prior theories of justice and desert have largely presumed a certain 
view of man and society that is empirically false. J.G. Murphy pointed to this discrepancy 
found in much of the literature in his piece entitled, Marxism and Retribution. Murphy 
argues that the Marxian challenge to traditional Kantian and Hegelian views of man and 
society is in fact valid and should direct our attention to the empirical realities of crime 
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and punishment. The traditional Kantian and Hegelian views rely on a "rationality" of 
man. According to their views, the criminal has willed her own punishment upon herself 
and has a right to be punished under a penal code that she would have chosen for herself 
in the original position of choice (Murphy, 55). This traditional retributivist outlook has 
heavily influenced the work of modern contractual thinkers such as John Rawls. The idea 
of a social contract is a "model of rational choice" under which people would treat each 
other as they would have reasonably expected to be treated from an original position of 
choice (Murphy, 55-56). Under a theory such as this, we presume the rationality of 
modern institutions of justice and punishment. The Marxian challenge to this theory finds 
that this theory "does not have application in concrete fact the actual social world in 
which we live," (Murphy, 57). 
My contention is that the Marxian challenge is essentially correct, but there exists 
no solution to the problem posed because it is immensely difficult to establish a theory 
which respects a certain degree of freedom of human rationality whilst acknowledging 
the economic and often irrational nature of criminality. The solution resides in the 
establishment of fair opportunities, but not from a morally arbitrary standpoint. The 
socially and economically disadvantaged people of capitalist societies deserve 
opportunities on the basis of need and under a principle of diachronic fairness. Once the 
established institutions of government have secured a reasonable degree of fairness of 
opportunities, of which the majority of the socially and economically deprived can 
choose to take advantage, then the institutions of justice may carry out punishments 
(emphasis added because, under such a system, penal laws may not even be necessary) 
with a presumption of rationality which retributive social contract theory is based upon. 
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When I refer to a principle of diachronic fairness, I borrow from Sher's 
construction of DF3, which states that, "for every good G, every person M, and every 
period of time P, if M has less (or more) of G than he should during P, then M should 
have correspondingly more (or less) of G or some related good he otherwise should 
during some later period P, " (Sher, 94). This principle of diachronic fairness seems 
appropriate for our conception of fair opportunities in a retributive state. For if a capitalist 
society can accept this principle, such a society can presume that its members would be in 
a rational position of choice because the distributive concerns of the disadvantaged would 
be adequately addressed. 
In order to illuminate the central point of my argument here, I will develop a 
hypothetical example of a typical criminal in a modern capitalist setting. Consider the life 
of an impoverished African-American male raised in a structurally and socially 
disadvantaged urban area. From an early age, opportunities for upward economic and 
social mobility are sparse. His single mother works two jobs to pay rent, bills, and put 
food on the table. Taking the time to transport her child to various social extracurricular 
activities is simply out of the question. Therefore, the boy develops in a setting close to 
home around children in a similar position of disadvantage. The setting is filled with 
violence, drugs, and other temptations which his active participation in would prevent 
him from climbing the socioeconomic hierarchy later in life. He eventually finds himself 
immersed in a drug-infested, violent criminal network of underprivileged youth who 
identify with his situation and carry similar feelings of isolation, alienation, and 
repression. During a drug raid on their commune, our deviated youth is apprehended and 
charged with possession and intent to sell narcotics and possession of an unregistered 
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handgun. He faces a minimum 15 years in prison under the harsh penal codes 
surrounding his offenses. 
Though for the moment it is simply my own hypothetical construction, this 
example is not unheard of and is based entirely in empirical truths of our modern 
capitalist societies. The key points to take away from it are that criminals are often 
alienated from the mainstream and their motives are the product of a capitalist economy 
that fiercely encourages the acquisition of material goods. My example is not meant to 
excuse offenders of such crimes, but it intended to highlight the specific flaw found in 
traditional social contract and retributive theory. Humans are not entirely rational in such 
an economic setting. Under a Frankfurtian conception of a person, however, we can view 
humans as capable of choosing second-order volitions from a pool of first-order desires. 
The goal then is to afford people reasonable opportunities for prosperity in a capitalist 
society. This principle of fairness can correspond to DF3, with opportunity understood as 
the good G. Of course, this would presume that those who enjoy more opportunity at 
some point would have to enjoy less at some later point. This may seem problematic, but 
once opportunity has been afforded to a person the prospects of their need developing 
later on will diminish. 
My proposal of a principle of fairness grounded in empirical truths has the 
capacity to alleviate the asymmetry found between retributive and distributive deserts as 
well. Recall that the problem of asymmetry lies within the fact that retributive theory 
generally accepts moral desert, whereas distributive theory commonly rejects it. Here I 
have constructed a principle which accepts moral desert for the purposes of distributive 
justice. Embodied within the principle is the understanding of empirical facts, which have 
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shown us that without this foundational understanding of moral desert based upon 
reasonable needs we will witness a criminal class of the least advantaged emerge. Under 
a principle of fair opportunities, retribution and distribution will balance and the moral 
deserts prescribed by retribution will be buttressed by the moral deserts recognized in 
distribution. A concern that I cannot address here but will have to be considered by future 
writers is the state of retributive institutions. From the conclusions I have drawn here, one 
could assume the best possible retributive institution would have to adopt a restorative 
approach to punishment. The role of an emerging restorative system of justice should be 




Black, Donald. "The Geometry of Terrorism." Sociological Theory 22, 1: 14-25. 
Frankfurt, Harry. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." What Do We 
Deserve? A Reader on Justice and Desert. Eds. Louis P. Pojman and Owen 
McLeod. New York: Oxford University, 1999. 125-134. 
Lareau, Annette. Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life. Berkeley: 
University of California, 2003. 
McLeod, Owen. "Desert and Wages." What Do We Deserve? A Reader on Justice and 
Desert. Eds. Louis P. Pojman and Owen McLeod. New York: Oxford University, 
1999.271-282. 
Miller, David. "Deserts." What Do We Deserve? A Reader on Justice and Desert. Eds. 
Louis P. Pojman and Owen McLeod. New York: Oxford University, 1999. 93-
100. 
Moriarty, Jeffrey. "Against the Asymmetry of Desert." Nous 37, 3: 518-536. 
Murphy, J.G. "Marxism and Retribution." Philosophy & Public Affairs 2: 217-243. 
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. 4th ed. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1999. 
49 
Rawls, John. "A Theory of Justice." What Do We Deserve? A Reader on Justice and 
Desert. Eds. Louis P. Pojman and Owen McLeod. New York: Oxford University, 
1999. 157-164. 
Rescher, Nicholas. Distributive Justice: A Constructive Critique of the Utilitarian Theory 
of Distribution. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co, 1966. 
Sher, George. Desert: Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy. Princeton: 
Princeton University, 1987. 
50 
